The carve happens in a spreadsheet, usually in November. The columns are account name, state, employee count, last year's revenue, and current owner. Somebody sorts by revenue, divides the rows by the number of reps, then nudges accounts between columns until each one sums to roughly the same number. The file gets a version suffix, goes to the VP, comes back with two swaps, and becomes next year's territories.
Nothing about that process is lazy. It uses every piece of data that was actually available at the time. That is the problem worth looking at, because the list of available columns is short, and every column on it describes an account in isolation rather than against the thing you are trying to sell it.
What territories actually get cut on
The Sales Management Association surveyed sales organizations on territory design and Xactly published the findings. Three numbers describe the state of practice better than any framework does. Seventy-six percent of companies assign territories by geography. Seventy-six percent do territory planning once a year. Eighty-three percent use spreadsheets to do it, moderately or frequently.
A fourth number explains the first three: fewer than 40 percent of companies believe they can properly measure the data that territory planning needs. When you cannot measure the thing you want to balance, you balance the thing you can count.
So the inputs become proxies, and each was a good proxy once. Geography stood in for travel cost when a rep drove to accounts. Employee count stood in for budget. Last year's revenue stood in for next year's. Industry code stood in for fit. Stack those four and you get a territory balanced on company size, drive time, and history, which is a reasonable description of a 1995 sales force and a poor description of a software company selling five products into a base that already owns two of them.
Andris Zoltners, Prabhakant Sinha and Sally Lorimer made the general version of this argument in Harvard Business Review: analytics had arrived across sales force decisions, and territory design was still the corner it had not reached. A decade on, the survey data says the corner is mostly still dark.
What the imbalance costs
The same research puts a number on the gap. Organizations that rate themselves effective at territory design hit sales objectives 14 percent above the average. Organizations that rate themselves ineffective land 15 percent below it. That is a 29 point spread on goal achievement, and the population is not evenly split: 64 percent of respondents put themselves in the ineffective or only somewhat effective camp.
Set that next to what quota attainment looks like now. RepVue's Q2 2025 Cloud Sales Index, covering 246 cloud and software companies and roughly 47,000 quota-carrying reps, put average attainment at 42.69 percent, with 57.31 percent of reps missing target. Territory design is obviously not the only cause of that. It is, however, one of the few causes a revenue operations team fully controls, and it is decided months before anyone can do anything about the rest.
The rep-level version is easier to see than the aggregate. Take two books that are perfectly balanced on the usual columns: 60 accounts each, matched on employee count bands, matched on prior-year revenue, contiguous regions, no overlap. One of those books happens to contain eleven accounts that replaced a system you integrate with in the last two quarters. The other contains one. Both reps carry the same number. Only one of them has a year.
Nothing in the spreadsheet knew about those eleven accounts, because the spreadsheet had no column for what an account needs from what you sell.
The column the spreadsheet does not have
It is worth laying the inputs side by side, because the gap stops being subtle once you ask what each one tells you about next quarter.
| Input | Where it comes from | What it tells you about next quarter |
|---|---|---|
| Employee count | Enrichment vendor | Whether they could afford it. Not whether they need it. |
| Industry code | CRM field | Which playbook to open. Not which product to open it to. |
| Last year's revenue | Billing system | What already sold. A weak predictor in a base with room left. |
| Geography | Address field | Travel cost, which is near zero for an inside team. |
| Open whitespace cell | Product catalogue plus billing | What has not sold yet. A gap, not a reason. |
| Matched buying signal | Public sources read against your catalogue | Which product, and why this quarter, with the source attached. |
The first five rows are facts about your filing cabinet or about the account's shape. Only the last row is a fact about the account's year, and it is the only row that requires knowing what you sell. That distinction is the whole argument. A whitespace cell tells you an account has not bought a product. A buying signal tells you why they might now: a hire, a funding round, a compliance deadline, a system change, a public statement about a problem you solve.
This is the job PitchSmart does. It reads every account on a list against what you actually sell, then returns the buying signals that say who needs which product now, each with the source it came from. The output is per account and per product, which means it can be summed into a book and compared across books.